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 Firms often adopt strategies in spite of mixed evidence about the strategy's perfor-
 mance and of evidence that the strategy leads to inefficient outcomes. Here, we
 describe the conditions prompting the spread of inefficient strategies through a
 population of firms, as well as the characteristics of individual firms that affect their
 propensity to adopt efficient and inefficient strategies. We focus on one pattern that
 appears common to strategic adoptions: a pattern where the number of unsuccessful
 adoptions exceeds the number of successful adoptions. We note how the failure to
 consider diffusion patterns in empirical strategic research limits use of that research
 as a source of prescriptive theory.
 Strategic researchers often express surprise
 when the adoption rate for popular strategies,
 such as downsizing (Cascio, 1993) or mergers
 (Lubatkin & Lane, 1996), persists despite appar-
 ent evidence of their ineffectiveness or ineffi-
 ciency. The widespread diffusion of such strat-
 egies is evident (Hwang, 1991), yet strategy
 researchers have examined only partially why
 organizations continue to adopt and retain
 poorly performing strategies. One reason for the
 scant attention to the spread of unsuccessful
 strategies is scholars' assumption, frequently
 present in strategic perspectives, that strategy
 selections are based on a rational choice per-
 spective, which presumes that outcomes are
 known a priori and that managers are efficiency
 oriented. Viewed from perspectives less reliant
 on assumptions of rationality, the persistence of
 inefficient strategy choices is unsurprising.
 Because strategic choices are similar to in-
 novations, research on the diffusion of innova-
 tions offers insights as to why such strategies
 as mergers and downsizing might continue to
 spread through populations, despite their in-
 efficiency. Pioneering studies by Abrahamson
 (1991, 1996) and Abrahamson and colleagues
 (1993, 1994) broadened our understanding of
 how administrative innovations are diffused
 or are rejected within organizational groups.
 Abrahamson and his colleagues described
 administrative innovations as structural and
 cultural changes that organizations prescribe
 for mediating between organizational inputs
 and outputs. The selection of a strategy is
 more encompassing than an administrative
 innovation: a strategy substantially broadens
 or narrows the domain of an organization in a
 new way. The domain of the organization re-
 fers to the products or services that the organ-
 ization produces and the population it serves
 (Thompson, 1967). Although not always the
 case, most strategic choices will tend to have
 greater economic impact on an organization
 than administrative innovations. This great
 impact occurs because strategies such as
 mergers, downsizing, and privatization gener-
 ally are implemented in short time frames and
 have significant up-front costs. Through the
 considerable expansion or shrinkage engen-
 dered by these changes, the organization is
 subject to a potentially rapid and visible shift
 in performance.
 In this article we draw on Abrahamson's (1991)
 notion of paradoxical theoretical explanation;
 following Poole and Van de Ven (1989), Abraham-
 son recognizes that paradoxes can be resolved if
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 researchers "(a) clarify levels of analysis, (b)
 take time into account, and (c) introduce new
 terms" (1991: 601). The paradox addressed here
 is that, at a single point in time, a set of strate-
 gies can include both efficient and inefficient
 incidents of adoption. For strategy scholars, this
 paradox is most vexing when a widely adopted
 strategic choice is dominated by inefficient ap-
 plications, wherein the majority of adoptions are
 inefficient. We address this paradox by moving
 from an organizational level of analysis to a
 population level of analysis, by considering the
 impact of time on strategic adoption, and by
 introducing new terms into conversation about
 strategy. We base these new terms on the con-
 cept of differences in diffusion patterns trig-
 gered by the adoption of strategies. Our discus-
 sion of diffusion applies Abrahamson's work to
 specific issues in strategic management and ap-
 plies an institutional perspective to the issue of
 strategic adoptions at the firm level. In addition,
 our discussion draws on organizational learn-
 ing and organizational memory literatures to
 help explain firm-level adoptions of strategies.
 Here, we address three important questions:
 (1) What does an institutional perspective, as
 contrasted with conventional strategy perspec-
 tives, imply about the efficiency of strategies
 diffused through a population? (2) What condi-
 tions cause the adoption and persistence of
 inefficient, rather than efficient, strategies?
 (3) What are the implications of variance in dif-
 fusion patterns for research and managerial
 practice? We suggest answers to these research
 questions as follows: First, we review the insti-
 tutionally based explanations of the diffusion of
 change. Second, we discuss different processes
 that promote the emergence of efficient and in-
 efficient adoptions of strategies and then de-
 scribe how these processes give rise to different
 diffusion patterns. In explaining mixed patterns
 of efficient and inefficient adoptions, we de-
 velop, in the third section of the paper, a model
 that focuses on environmental and organiza-
 tional influences on adoption processes. In the
 fourth section we examine specific research op-
 portunities drawn from our model of strategy
 diffusion patterns. We conclude the article with
 a discussion of how managers might benefit
 from the model's implications. Throughout, we
 use the strategies of merger, downsizing, and
 privatization to illustrate our points.
 INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
 DIFFUSION OF CHANGE
 In their classic piece on isomorphism and col-
 lective rationality, DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
 note that innovations spread through organiza-
 tional fields via mimetic processes. They write:
 [E]arly adopters of organizational innovation are
 commonly driven by a desire to improve per-
 formance. But new practices can become, in
 Selznick's words (1957:17), 'infused with value be-
 yond the technical requirements of the task at
 hand.' As innovation spreads, a threshold is
 reached beyond which adoption provides legiti-
 macy rather than improves performance. (1983:
 148).
 The diffusion process DiMaggio and Powell
 describe implies that the nature of innovation in
 (and perhaps across) organizational fields'
 changes in character as norms of legitimacy
 build over time. At first, organizations adopting
 the change do so because of the impact of that
 change on performance. Once the change
 reaches a critical mass of acceptance within the
 field of organizations, it attains further wide-
 spread acceptance with less regard to its per-
 formance impact. A high proportion of firms
 adopting the change do so because other organ-
 izations have adopted it and because stakehold-
 ers define the change as accepted practice.
 Oliver (1991), based on a comparison of insti-
 tutional and resource dependence perspectives,
 describes how firms resist institutional pres-
 sures to conform to the use of popular strategies.
 Institutional pressures emerge from a variety of
 sources in the environment, including regula-
 tory structures, governmental agencies, laws,
 courts, professions, interest groups, and public
 opinion (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987;
 Zucker, 1987). She proposes that some organiza-
 tions resist institutional pressures to act in spec-
 ified ways through such tactics as avoidance
 and defiance. The variables that predict organi-
 zational resistance include the multiplicity of
 the organization's constituents and the organi-
 zation's interconnectedness with the source of
 the change. For example, organizations de-
 1 DiMaggio and Powell focus their discussion on innova-
 tions within fields. Abrahamson and Rosenkopf focus on
 collectivities: collections of organizations that have knowl-
 edge of each other's innovations. Our focus here is on
 strategies, which spread within and across fields and
 collectivities.
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 pendent on powerful stakeholders will resist
 changes inimical to the interests of those stake-
 holders. In contrast, organizations will be
 quick to adopt changes suggested by powerful
 customers.
 Oliver's model implies a partial diffusion of
 institutionally induced changes, where some or-
 ganizations adopt a newly legitimated change,
 whereas other organizations resist that same
 change. Her thesis shows that the diffusion of
 change is time dependent and that the time de-
 pendency is shaped (in part) by the relation-
 ships between the characteristics of the change
 and those of the organizational population. The
 model predicts organizational resistance to a
 change. A corollary point is that some organiza-
 tions do not resist. More importantly, not all or-
 ganizations embracing a change match the con-
 ditions required to achieve a level of technical
 efficiency in the adopting organization.
 Whereas Oliver depicts resistance to institu-
 tional pressures, Abrahamson and Rosenkopf
 (1993) describe factors that create bandwagon
 effects. Bandwagons are diffusion processes
 wherein adopters choose an innovation not be-
 cause of its technical properties but because of
 the sheer numbers of adoptions that have al-
 ready taken place. As more firms adopt innova-
 tions, pressure increases for other firms to adopt
 them. Bandwagons create self-reinforcing loops
 because the bigger the bandwagon gets, the
 larger the number of organizations tending to
 join the bandwagon. In turn, the larger the num-
 ber of organizations, the larger the bandwagon's
 effects. In their work Abrahamson and Rosen-
 kopf (1993) use mathematical modeling to dem-
 onstrate that minor variations in the distribution
 of expected returns from a given innovation trig-
 ger bandwagon effects and, therefore, wider dif-
 fusion of the innovation. Similarly, the greater
 the uncertainty surrounding an innovation, the
 greater the diffusion.
 Taken together, Oliver's and Abrahamson and
 Rosenkopf's works provide a foundation for de-
 scribing a system of countervailing forces in the
 diffusion of strategies across organizational
 populations. Although uncertainty triggers
 bandwagon pressures, some firms resist the so-
 cial pressures triggered by bandwagons. Ulti-
 mately, the interplay of institutional forces and
 resource dependencies leads to differing pat-
 terns of strategy diffusion. Conventional ap-
 proaches to strategy imply that most adoptions
 are efficient. However, there can be differing
 patterns of diffusion.
 One diffusion pattern-that generally as-
 sumed in strategy studies-occurs when all
 adoptions are efficient. A second pattern occurs
 when all adoptions are inefficient. But mixed or
 hybrid patterns also occur. In this article we
 define two hybrid patterns of diffusion. We de-
 fine the hybrid diffusion pattern occurring when
 the number of efficient adoptions exceeds the
 number inefficient adoptions as "dominant effi-
 cient." When the number of inefficient adop-
 tions exceeds the number of efficient adoptions,
 we define the diffusion pattern as "dominant
 inefficient."
 The most interesting, and perhaps most re-
 alistic, diffusion patterns are the hybrids.
 They are interesting because conclusions
 based on analysis of these patterns, but lack-
 ing recognition of their hybrid character, can
 be misleading. For example, most scholars of
 strategy, in their studies, group firms together
 on the basis of those firms' adoption of a spe-
 cific strategy. Based on the average perfor-
 mance across the groupings used, their stud-
 ies make a prescriptive conclusion. For a
 hybrid pattern such a conclusion can be mis-
 leading, unless the conclusion identifies
 boundary conditions specifying the difference
 between efficient and inefficient adoptions in
 the group under study. An understanding of
 diffusion patterns can help provide those
 boundary conditions.
 Mergers, downsizings, and privatizations
 apparently exhibit hybrid diffusion patterns.
 Mergers often fail to meet their intended ends
 or frequently fail to achieve break-even levels
 of performance (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991;
 Lubatkin & Lane, 1996; Nahavandi & Malekza-
 deh, 1988; Porter, 1987; Ravenscraft & Scherer,
 1987). Similarly, downsizings have not worked
 in a majority of applications (Cameron, Free-
 man, & Mishra, 1991; Cascio, 1993). Finally,
 Pollit (1991) notes that advocacy of privatiza-
 tion frequently is an expression of an ideol-
 ogy; therefore, firms privatize without regard
 for the specific contextual factors that might
 determine privatization's utility (Pouder, 1996).
 Diffusion processes provide at least some ex-
 planation for the varied levels of success in
 these strategies.
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 PROCESSES THAT PROMOTE EFFICIENT AND
 INEFFICIENT ADOPTIONS
 Major innovations are rarely, if ever, fully doc-
 umented at their source. Rather, ex post investi-
 gations reconstruct the "facts" of the initial
 innovation. These reconstructions show that in-
 novations result from serendipity, strategic
 choice, entrepreneurship, or desperation (Kauf-
 man, 1985). Once initiated, innovations spread.
 Kimberly writes: "Imitation is likely to play a
 more significant role in the diffusion and adop-
 tion of managerial innovation than technologi-
 cal innovation" (1981: 87). Our focus here is on
 strategic actions as managerial innovations.
 Successful strategic actions prompt imitation
 by other organizations because these actions
 are rarely patentable and often portable. Porta-
 ble change must meet two conditions. First, the
 change must have been visible in the organiza-
 tion of origin. Without visibility, the change
 would not stand out among the many random
 changes taking place in the normal flow of or-
 ganizational events. Second, the mimicking or-
 ganizations must have some perceived need for
 change. Without this need, inertial properties in
 the adopting organization would countervail the
 change. In addition, organizations sensing a
 need for change may scan their environments
 more actively, thereby increasing the possibility
 of observing changes made elsewhere.
 Repeated successes among organizations
 adopting a change prompt other organizations
 to consider the same change, especially in com-
 petitive environments (Kimberly & Evanisko,
 1980). The initial pattern of success triggers a
 form of the bandwagon effect, which can vary in
 strength. In early stages the growth in the rate of
 diffusion may not debilitate the performance-
 enhancing properties of a strategic choice. How-
 ever, as diffusion continues, returns to the strat-
 egy sometimes atrophy. Returns dissipate if the
 diffusion of the change limits its rent-producing
 potential. As resource economists note, the rent-
 producing property of an asset is tied to the
 unique nature of that asset (Barney, 1988). Once
 the asset can be imitated, all owners of the asset
 have the same production functions and the
 same cost structures. In turn, increasing rates of
 adoption lead to price reduction pressures that
 lessen the value of the innovation.
 However, as Abrahamson and Rosenkopf
 (1993) demonstrated in a computer simulation,
 success is not a prerequisite for diffusion of the
 innovation or change. We presumed above that
 initially adopted strategic changes are success-
 ful, based on the limited empirical evidence
 available to explain the diffusion of strategic
 innovations (Rumelt, 1974). However, diffusions
 can exhibit the characteristics of the "blind
 leading the blind."2 For example, in bandwag-
 ons triggered by competitive pressures, firms
 may adopt inefficient innovations based on
 their fear that other firms will use them success-
 fully. Also, firms may conclude that the cost of
 adopting an inefficient innovation is less than
 the cost of not adopting it.
 Competitive bandwagon patterns can trigger
 diffusion patterns for inefficient innovations, but
 conditions favoring a consistently efficient pat-
 tern also exist. In the case of positive external-
 ities, increasing rates of adoption trigger in-
 creasing rates of return for the population of
 adopters (Hill, 1997). For at least some window of
 time, then, the diffusion of these innovations
 follows a pattern in which all adoptions are
 efficient.
 Our main interest, in this article, is in patterns
 in which both inefficient and efficient adoptions
 occur. What processes explain why inefficient
 adoptions frequently follow efficient adoptions?
 Initially, innovations tend to diffuse in a logical
 context (Rogers, 1995), which is most often the
 local environment where problem search occurs
 (Cyert & March, 1963). Inefficient adoptions fre-
 quently follow efficient adoptions as the diffu-
 sion of a change leads to its application in con-
 texts different from its initial application. As a
 specific change becomes more widespread,
 knowledge of that change crosses the bound-
 aries of different organizational fields. Put dif-
 ferently, awareness of the change penetrates
 the bounds of an increasing number of different
 populations of organizations.
 Bounded rationality contributes to the emer-
 gence of inefficient adoptions following efficient
 ones. Limits to the rationality of decision makers
 within organizations act as blinders on the de-
 cision process. Late adopters fail to notice the
 difference in context as they apply the strategy,
 and, as a consequence, the strategy may not fit
 the context. Given these forces, we find it not
 2 We are grateful to anonymous reviewers for this and
 related insights.
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 surprising that DiMaggio and Powell could
 write that "strategies that are rational for indi-
 vidual organizations may not be rational if
 adopted by large numbers of organizations"
 (1983: 148).
 Processes of organizational learning also fos-
 ter the emergence of inefficient adoptions fol-
 lowing efficient ones. Levinthal and March
 (1993) describe how the successes of pioneering
 organizations often become public goods, with
 the result that an attractive option for any indi-
 vidual organization is to exploit the successful
 imitation of others. As more organizations do
 this, the value of the innovation declines.
 PATTERNS IN THE DIFFUSION OF A
 STRATEGY: A MULTILEVEL MODEL
 The focus of this article is on distributions
 containing more inefficient than efficient adopt-
 ers (dominant inefficient). We use four measures
 to characterize the pattern dominated by ineffi-
 cient adoptions. First, speed measures the rate
 at which the distribution reaches the point when
 the number of inefficient adoptions exceeds the
 number of efficient adoptions. Second, breadth
 measures the proportion of potential adopters of
 a strategy adopting the strategy. Third, the size
 of the efficiency gap is a measure of the differ-
 ence between the number of inefficient and ef-
 ficient adoptions, and the persistence of the ef-
 ficiency gap measures the extent to which the
 difference is temporal or persistent. Finally,
 strategy refers to an organizational change that
 substantially broadens or narrows the domain
 of an organization in a new way, such as down-
 sizing, merger, privatization, or major attempts
 to capture share. We describe three major
 factors jointly influencing the properties of the
 diffusion pattern: (1) the environment, (2) charac-
 teristics of the adopting organization, and
 (3) characteristics of the strategy itself.
 Environmental Influences
 To understand diffusion patterns of strategy,
 we need knowledge of conditions that foster
 contrasting orientations toward stability or
 search for change within organizations. Envi-
 ronmental uncertainty is one condition or con-
 struct that influences the predisposition of organ-
 izations toward stability or change.
 "Environmental uncertainty" is the degree of
 unpredictability in future environmental states
 (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As Oliver (1991) notes,
 low environmental uncertainty increases the
 tendency of organizations to remain stable or to
 avoid change. In times of low uncertainty, organ-
 izations are confident in their ability to produce
 future returns. The predictability of outcomes
 provides management with the illusion of con-
 trol and some sense of comfort with the status
 quo.
 Similarly, institutional theorists argue that
 managers have a strong need for certainty and
 stability (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Predictable
 or certain environments rate high in munifi-
 cence, high in stability, and low in complexity
 (Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988). Environ-
 ments low in uncertainty provide managers
 with the luxury of avoiding the selection of
 major new strategic directives. This notion of
 persistence in past patterns is consistent with
 models of organizational reorientation and
 transformation, which show that during times of
 convergence (which implies a high amount of
 certainty about the environment), organizations
 do not adopt new patterns of behavior often
 (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Tushman & Ro-
 manelli, 1985). If many organizations resist
 change, both the speed and breadth of diffusion
 slows down.
 Conversely, in times of high uncertainty, or-
 ganizations may seek change and are more
 likely to imitate other organizations, especially
 if those organizations are norm setters (DiMag-
 gio & Powell, 1983). Adopting actions similar to
 those found in other organizations affords man-
 agement a measure of credibility, especially if
 the actions provide some publicity (Kimberly,
 1981). Specific strategies become the fashion or
 norm for dealing with uncertainty, and stake-
 holders begin to expect managers to adopt these
 strategies (Abrahamson, 1996). Indeed, the un-
 certainty may prompt once compliant stakehold-
 ers to take a more active position, thereby in-
 creasing the pressure on management to adopt
 strategies used by norm-setting firms. During
 times of uncertainty, managers engage in activ-
 ities to reduce the perception or impact of uncer-
 tainty, such as scanning or diversification (Agui-
 lar, 1967; Fahey & Narayanan, 1986; Rumelt,
 1974). Each technique increases the organiza-
 tion's exposure to changes in the environment.
 As organizations actively search for options and
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 mimic each other in times of high uncertainty,
 the speed and breadth of diffusion increase.
 One reason why diffusion patterns vary is that
 the response to environmental uncertainty unfolds
 at an uneven pace across a population of organi-
 zations. For example, in several industry-specific
 studies, researchers found that strategic change
 occurred less frequently than expected as environ-
 ments shifted from low to high uncertainty follow-
 ing deregulation in railroads (Smith & Grimm,
 1987) and in savings and loan institutions (Jarvi-
 dan, 1984). In contrast, Zajac and Shortell (1989) did
 find that 55 percent of hospitals changed strate-
 gies in response to environmental uncertainties.
 Importantly, the impact of uncertainty varies
 in the early and late stages of the diffusion
 process. Bandwagon effects occur when increas-
 ing numbers of firms adopt a strategy. Early
 adopters, however, must adopt the strategy be-
 fore the bandwagon effects emerge. At this early
 point, the presence of uncertainty implies risk
 and therefore increases the expected returns a
 firm might require before adopting a strategy.
 Firms that select strategies early in the diffusion
 process may be well matched to the require-
 ments of those strategies as the fear of the risk
 repels less well-matched firms. These early
 adopters should earn some returns on their
 strategy, especially in the presence of first
 mover advantages or in the absence of imita-
 tors. This very success, though, eventually leads
 to imitators as the success becomes more widely
 known. However, late adopters may not be well
 matched to the requirements of the strategy, and
 imitation may lead to lower economic returns.
 Of course, not all first adopters need be well
 matched to the requirements of the strategy.
 Early adopters can be inefficient. Also, effi-
 ciency among early adopters could be the result
 of lucky accidents. Finally, the conditions
 prompting success could be unique to the early
 adopting firms. For example, Ford's early suc-
 cesses with quality management processes
 might have been influenced by Ford's fear of
 failure. These adoptions, even though they are
 inefficient or prompted by unique circum-
 stances, also spread because uncertain environ-
 ments complicate analysis. Strategies will
 spread in uncertain environments, regardless of
 the influence of subtle differences in adoption
 contexts.
 Proposition la: Environmental uncer-
 tainty is positively related to the
 speed and breadth of a strategy's dif-
 fusion.
 Just as uncertainty influences the tendency to
 change among organizations, environmental
 uncertainty affects the properties of the diffu-
 sion pattern. Environmental uncertainty is pos-
 itively related to the size and persistence of the
 efficiency gap, because when uncertainty is
 high, organizations find it difficult to assess the
 utility of strategies (Perrow, 1986). As uncer-
 tainty increases, managers are less able to an-
 alyze or understand the relationship between
 organizational actions and outcomes. The level
 of uncertainty clouds the evaluation of both
 newly adopted strategies and conventional ac-
 tivities within the organizations. Since uncer-
 tainty affects both novel and routine actions,
 management quickly loses its ability to differ-
 entiate among the performance impacts of novel
 actions. This being the case, organizations tend
 to persist in the use of strategies because it is
 more difficult to assess their utility.
 The dynamic nature of competition also influ-
 ences the persistence of the efficiency gap. If the
 early adopters of the innovation fail to obtain
 some form of permanent advantage, their initial
 returns will begin to dissipate in the presence of
 increased competition, which leads to a down-
 ward spiral in performance (Levinthal & March,
 1993). If the firms initially efficient become inef-
 ficient, the size of the efficiency gap increases.
 The reputation effects triggered by the success
 of the early entry may linger, though, so that
 other firms continue to mimic the strategy,
 which will increase the persistence of the effi-
 ciency gap. The dynamic process is similar to
 that proposed in models of hypercompetition,
 which suggest that economic advantages dissi-
 pate quickly (D'Aveni, 1994).
 Proposition lb: Environmental uncer-
 tainty is positively related to the size
 and persistence of the efficiency gap.
 The media of change or the transmission
 channels providing opportunities for change
 (Kaufman, 1985) and organizational networks in-
 fluence the opportunities for the diffusion of
 change.
 A firm's set of competitors and suppliers is
 its closest source of ideas. This network of com-
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 petitors and suppliers has been described as
 the firm's "macroculture." Abrahamson and
 Fombrun define a macroculture as the "relative-
 ly idiosyncratic, organizational-related beliefs
 that are shared among top managers across or-
 ganizations" (1994: 730). Since macrocultures
 share similar beliefs and face similar con-
 straints, adoption of strategies within them
 should spread quickly, as compared to adop-
 tions across cultures. This is because members
 of a macroculture have more information about
 each other so that mimicry occurs easily. Mac-
 rocultures, by definition, are highly intercon-
 nected, and the level of interconnectedness pro-
 motes the voluntary diffusion of ideas and
 norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991).
 Interconnectedness is a result of the resource
 dependencies among suppliers and buyers, as
 well as among competitors, within a macrocul-
 ture. For example, one competitor may adopt a
 strategy that becomes valued by customers;
 other competitors, seeking the same customers,
 then need to consider adopting that strategy.
 Similarly, one supplier may announce a plan to
 become more efficient by downsizing; quickly,
 other suppliers face pressures to do the same.
 Changes or innovations cross macroculture
 borders less quickly, with the speed of change
 determined by the nature of interconnects be-
 tween the macrocultures. For example, different
 macrocultures might be linked by vertical trans-
 actions among members of each macroculture.
 The greater the number of links between macro-
 cultures, the more frequent and more meaning-
 ful the interchange (Burt, 1982, 1987; Fombrun,
 1986). Dense links provide an excellent medium
 for transmitting information about strategies.
 Direct transactions are not the only links
 between macrocultures. Information about strat-
 egy travels through formal and informal commu-
 nications channels. Specific institutions special-
 ize in the transmission of information and include
 professional schools, professional trade associa-
 tions, consultant firms, investment banks, and
 some government agencies. Information about
 strategies should travel quickly between macro-
 cultures sharing identical information channels.
 For example, members of two different macrocul-
 tures sharing the same investment bank have ac-
 cess to similar information about mergers adopted
 in other macrocultures served by the bank.
 Macrocultures vary in the extent of homoge-
 neity of beliefs about boundaries and strategic
 issues. Homogeneous macrocultures tend to
 have very similar strategic agendas (Dutton &
 Duncan, 1987), which are listings of the most
 important issues facing the industry. A similar-
 ity of beliefs about agendas leads to a similarity
 of beliefs about necessary actions to take in
 response to that agenda. Therefore, firms in a
 homogeneous macroculture are likely to adopt
 similar strategies. Conversely, where there is
 some disparity in beliefs about the boundaries
 and agendas, there are differences among firms
 regarding strategies adopted.
 Although information about adoptions is
 readily portable across macroculture borders,
 the adoptions themselves may be less portable.
 Differences in technology across macrocultures
 affect the utility of any specific strategy: an ac-
 tion that performs well in an environment with
 highly developed technological paradigms may
 not perform as well as in an environment with
 a poorly developed paradigm (Kimberly, 1981).
 Strategic actions that work well at one end of
 the vertical chain may not work at all at the
 other end of the vertical chain because of differ-
 ences in the shared dominant logics at each end
 (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). The greater the differ-
 ences between macrocultures, the more likely
 that adoptions of strategies common to one will
 be inefficient for the other. For example, the
 effects of downsizing should differ in capital-
 and labor-intensive industries.
 Discussion of macrocultures and the diffusion
 of strategies holds interesting implications for
 the notions of "seeding" ideas of strategy
 change or best practice. Firms facing a chang-
 ing environment often are advised to change
 strategies. For example, firms in the defense
 industry are advised to adopt diversification
 strategies, or firms in recovering economies are
 counseled to adopt western strategies. To the
 extent that diversification or western strategies
 represent different macrocultures for the de-
 fense firm or the firm in a recovering economy,
 the chances that the adoption of the suggested
 strategy will be inefficient increase.
 Similarly, lead firms in a macroculture may
 try to impose strategies on other firms. The firms
 likely to resist the imposition are those not de-
 pendent on the lead firms for resources. In turn,
 these nondependent firms (and nonadopting)
 may be the better managed firms in the group.
 The firms adopting the suggested routines may
 have less skillful managers than the nonadopt-
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 ing firms and, therefore, may be less likely to
 benefit from the change. Also, the benefits from
 the change may not make the adopters as strong
 as those firms resisting the change. To the ex-
 tent that the lead firm replaces stronger non-
 adopters with weaker adopters, the net result
 could be a decline in performance.
 Proposition 2a: Adoptions spread
 more quickly within macrocultures
 than across macrocultures.
 Proposition 2b: The more links between
 macrocultures, the more quickly adop-
 tions will spread.
 Proposition 2c: The greater the homo-
 geneity within a macroculture, the
 greater the speed and breadth of
 adoptions within that macroculture
 will be.
 Proposition 2d: The greater the dif-
 ference between macrocultures, the
 greater the size and persistence of the
 efficiency gap will be.
 Organizational Factors
 To this point we have discussed the influence
 of the environment. Organizations exhibit many
 unique patterns, and, as a result, the impact of
 the environment is not equally distributed
 among all organizations. Therefore, the follow-
 ing propositions refer to an organization level of
 analysis to describe those organizational fac-
 tors influencing the character of diffusion pat-
 terns. At the organizational level "speed" is the
 rapidity of a specific organization's adoption of
 a newly popular strategy, in contrast to the
 speed with which that strategy spreads through
 the population of organizations. "Persistence"
 refers to the length of time a specific organiza-
 tion pursues an inefficient strategy. The vari-
 able "breadth" has no application in this organ-
 ization-specific context since it refers to
 diffusion across a set of organizations.
 An organization's past success influences its
 receptivity to change and learning. For exam-
 ple, Levinthal and March (1993) describe learn-
 ing myopia in organizations. Organizations with
 a long history of success promote individuals
 who have been successful, and these individu-
 als attribute the cause of their success inter-
 nally (Miller & Ross, 1975). The success patterns
 lead managers to overestimate the value of past
 routines. Thus, organizations overinvest in ex-
 ploitation of past learning and underinvest in
 the "folly" of exploration (Levinthal & March,
 1981). Organizations with a long history of suc-
 cess, then, are unlikely to adopt new strategies.
 If these organizations do adopt new strate-
 gies, the pattern of success and the attribution
 patterns lead to an overconfidence in their abil-
 ity to manage the new strategies. Successful
 managers in successful organizations tend to
 underestimate risks and overestimate returns.
 Once the organization adopts an innovation,
 these managers' tendencies favor the persis-
 tence of adoption in the presence of objective
 evidence of its failure. A history of success leads
 to confidence that causes decision makers to
 reinterpret results "to make them more favor-
 able" (Levinthal & March, 1993: 104). Sitkin (1992)
 uses the term "liabilities of success" to describe
 how successful organizations restrict their search
 and devote low levels of attention to difficult
 problems.
 Proposition 3: An organization's past
 success is negatively related to the
 speed and positively related to the
 persistence of adoption of a strategy.
 Just as an organization's success influences
 its adoption patterns, the relationships between
 an early adopter and later adopters influence
 the patterns in adoption. Organizations learn by
 looking at other organizations. One criterion
 that organizations use to evaluate adoptions is
 the adoption behavior of other firms. Firm deci-
 sion makers will be prompted to study "ideal"
 organizations, looking for incidence of best
 practices, which will prompt higher levels of
 mimetic behavior toward ideal organizations
 (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and quicker adoption
 of strategies observed in modal organizations.
 Simultaneously, the comparison to ideal organi-
 zations should prompt less resistance within the
 adopting organization, thereby adding to the
 likelihood of speedy adoption.
 However, mimicry does not create perfor-
 mance. Levinthal and March (1993) argue that
 when firms form their aspirations on the basis of
 comparison to superior performers, those high
 aspirations cause the firms to fall short of at-
 taining their aspirations. Generally, this in-
 duces more risk-seeking behavior-a behavior
 consistent with maintaining investment in an
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 inefficient adoption. In these situations firms
 may be willing to increase their commitment to
 failing strategies (Staw & Ross, 1987).
 The proposal that quick mimicry of other or-
 ganizations will follow performance shortfalls
 may appear to run counter to assertions that
 rigid behavior follows performance declines
 (Starbuck, Greve, & Hedberg, 1978; Staw, Sand-
 elands, & Dutton, 1981). However, performance
 shortfalls need not be signals of decline. Firms
 react differently to modest shortfalls and steep
 declines (Fombrun & Ginsberg, 1990). Possibly,
 the rigid behaviors follow a period of unsuccess-
 ful mimicry, when organizational actors begin to
 devalue innovation and rely on past routine.
 The diffusion of adoptions from leaders to lag-
 gards and the persistence of these adoptions
 lead to two interesting issues regarding strate-
 gic change. First, leaders may be limited in the
 range of options they consider, inducing a con-
 servatism that extends to their imitators. For
 example, Cooper and Schendel (1976) demon-
 strated how established firms rarely adopt new
 technologies. Second, to the extent that adop-
 tions persist within an organization, the adop-
 tions may outlast the careers of the original de-
 cision makers; the reasons for the adoption get
 lost in history as managers progress or retire.
 New managers may lack sufficient perspective
 to understand previous decisions or reasons for
 their inefficiency.
 Proposition 4: The size of the perfor-
 mance difference between the first
 adopter and competing organizations
 is positively related to both the speed
 of adoption and the persistence of an
 inefficient strategy.
 Our propositions, to this point, presume that
 organizations are myopic learners. Although
 Levinthal and March (1993) plead for conserva-
 tism in expectations about organizational learn-
 ing, we believe it is possible that some organi-
 zations are better learners than others or better
 mimics than others. Sitkin (1992) provides argu-
 ments detailing how organizations can avoid
 patterns of myopic learning: organizations en-
 gaging in frequent experiments and learning
 from the failure of some of those experiments
 should build their confidence in adopting new
 strategies, as well as their ability in evaluating
 new strategies. Sitkin labels these experiments
 "small failures." We expect that firms engaging
 in small failures will adopt new strategies
 but will not persist in the pursuit of inefficient
 strategies.
 It is not clear why some firms experience and
 tolerate small failures, whereas others do not.
 Cohen and Levinthal (1990) use the term "ab-
 sorptive capacity" to describe an organization's
 ability to learn. Capacity increases via the use
 of internal and external networks. Experience
 through the networks provides the organization
 with information about alternatives. In turn,
 consideration and deliberation about the alter-
 natives counter tendencies to restrict informa-
 tion or to reject contrary data. In a sense, firms
 with high levels of absorptive capacity use their
 internal and external networks to directly expe-
 rience some small failure and, perhaps more
 importantly, to understand and learn from the
 small failures experienced by others in the
 network.
 Regarding strategy, we could possibly argue
 that effective organizational learning is a re-
 quirement for survival in hypercompetitive en-
 vironments. Where the attainment of a semi-
 permanent competitive advantage is possible in
 an environment of limited competition, the ad-
 vent of hypercompetition leads to erosion in his-
 torically based advantages and to a require-
 ment to create more advantages. Organizations
 that understand the dynamics of adopting and
 evaluating novel strategies should have some
 advantage in a hypercompetitive world.
 Proposition 5: A history of small fail-
 ures is positively related to the speed
 of adoption and negatively related to
 persistence of inefficiency.
 "Organizational memory" also influences
 adoption behavior and outcomes. The influence
 occurs because organizational memory deter-
 mines the information an organization is likely
 to observe and the response the organization
 will have to the information. For example, the
 foregoing discussion was based on an implicit
 assumption about behavior based on organiza-
 tional memory. The discussion presumed that
 organizations would notice information about
 modal organizations and would respond by
 modeling the behavior of those organizations.
 Walsh and Ungson define organizational
 memory as a "retention facility, the information
 stored in it, the processes of information acqui-
 sition and retrieval, and its consequential ef-
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 fects" (1991: 61). Organizational memory affects
 the speed of adoption of strategies and the char-
 acteristics of the efficiency gap for those strate-
 gies. The two retention bins most relevant for
 the adoption and performance of strategies are
 those Walsh and Ungson label "structures" and
 "external memory."
 Structure refers to the set of roles, and inter-
 relationships within those roles, comprising the
 set of acceptable behaviors within the organiza-
 tion. The roles become "patterned over time to
 depict task differentiation and control" (Walsh &
 Ungson, 1991: 66). Put a bit differently, the struc-
 ture reflects the software codes that program the
 organization's responses to external stimuli.
 These codes act at both a cognitive and reflex-
 ive level. We presume that most of the code is
 reflexive and that it represents a form of shared
 perceptions about the appropriate patterns for
 task differentiation and control.
 With regard to strategic changes, those that
 match existing structural schema in the organiza-
 tion are more quickly adopted. In turn, those inno-
 vations not fitting existing structural schema lead
 to a larger efficiency gap, and persist longer in the
 presence of poor performance, than those innova-
 tions fitting existing structural schema.
 We base these predictions about the impact of
 memory structures on the memory's influence on
 information acquisition and information reten-
 tion. The organization can absorb and evaluate
 information that fits its structure quickly and
 easily, as compared to the task of absorbing and
 evaluating information that does not fit its struc-
 ture. In contrast, when adopting an innovation
 that does not fit the memory structure, the firm
 needs to replace previous associations and re-
 lationships with new ones. The scope of the task
 complicates evaluation. Inefficient solutions are
 tolerated longer as the organization learns to do
 things differently.
 Little is known about how firms might man-
 age memory and about the conditions that make
 memory liberating or constraining. Some writers
 note that memory is an enemy of organizations,
 since memory constrains both perception and
 behavioral repertories (Argyris & Schon, 1978).
 At the same time, though, the routines imposed
 on the organization by memory become auto-
 matic and, thereby, efficient. An unavoidable
 cost of being well matched to one environment
 may be great difficulty in adjusting to other en-
 vironments. One answer to this dilemma may be
 developing a capacity for flexible or adaptive
 memory. Another answer may be recognizing
 that memories are not infinitely elastic: some
 adaptations may not be possible. Given the
 emotional commitments of stakeholders to their
 organizations, powerful stakeholders will per-
 sist in their attempts to adapt organizations.
 These emotion-driven decisions then trigger the
 decision behaviors that lead to persistence.
 Proposition 6: Adoptions that fit with
 the organizational memory are posi-
 tively related to an organization's
 speed of adoption and negatively re-
 lated to the persistence of inefficiency.
 The Source of the Strategy
 In addition to the environment and the organ-
 izations, the properties of a strategy influence
 its diffusion pattern. For example, highly visible
 activities permeate the population quickly. This
 occurs because organizations live in a competi-
 tive and public world. Competition influences
 managers to seek new sources of gain. Novel
 strategies, especially those that cause gain, at-
 tract public attention and create a positive rep-
 utation effect. To the extent that novel activity
 can be duplicated by other organizations, the
 copying organization hopes to capture the same
 reputation effects, or at least to neutralize the
 advantage of the first adopter, in those cases
 where network externalities do not apply.
 MacMillan, McCaffery, and Van Wijk (1985) have
 found that visible actions are copied quickly by
 competitors, especially those most threatened
 by the action.
 If a strategy is indeed fully visible-that is,
 the major components of the strategy are known
 to the adopting organization-then success in
 imitation should be attained easily. Frequently,
 however, many of the details of a strategy inno-
 vation are not visible. For example, managers
 often express surprise about developments after
 installing strategies that apparently had suc-
 ceeded elsewhere. The surprise emerges be-
 cause the administrative details accompany-
 ing highly visible strategies are less visible
 than the strategies themselves (Cascio, 1993;
 Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). The persistence of
 inefficiency in these cases is related to the pro-
 portion of value added by these postadoption
 administrative activities. If substantial portions
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 of the value are captured after adoption and the
 paths to that value are not visible to adopting
 organizations, then the efficiency gap will be
 wide. Given the visibility of the initial action,
 the gap will persist, in part, because the cause
 of the postadoption inefficiency is difficult to
 diagnose. A second reason for the gap's persis-
 tence is that reversals of a highly visible action
 can be interpreted as failure or lack of con-
 trol, and managers need to appear in control
 (Salancik & Meindl, 1984).
 MacMillan et al. (1985) describe how a compet-
 itive response is delayed by organizational in-
 ertia in competitors. They found that complex
 products and products that challenge existing
 norms among competitors are less frequently
 imitated. Dewar and Dutton (1986) also have
 found that complexity affects adoptions. These
 same variables can be used to predict when
 imitative adoptions might be inefficient; they
 will be inefficient when they mimic complex
 strategies or strategies that do not fit prevailing
 norms. The portability of a strategy affects dif-
 fusion patterns in a manner similar to that noted
 for visibility. Highly portable actions will per-
 vade the organizational population quickly.
 Proposition 7a: The visibility and port-
 ability of the strategy, as well as the
 reputation of the strategy's source, are
 positively related to the speed and
 breadth of diffusion.
 Just as the purchase of easel and paints does
 not make the owner an artist, the appropriation
 of a portable strategy does not make its new
 adopter successful. Knowledge about the strat-
 egy may be embedded in a complex web of
 unarticulated routines (Badaracco, 1991; Perrow,
 1986) within the organization of origin. Where
 knowledge is tacit, strategies will not travel
 well. Put differently, visible elements of the
 strategy may travel across organizational bor-
 ders, but the embedded context of the innova-
 tion stays with the originator. In these instances
 the efficiency gap will be great, and the persis-
 tence of the gap will be directly related to the
 organization's ability to learn the techniques
 that support the strategy and to the organiza-
 tion's tolerance for "failed" innovation. As noted
 above, this tolerance will be higher in the case
 of highly visible adoptions.
 Proposition 7b: The visibility and port-
 ability of the strategy, as well as the
 reputation of its source, is positively
 related to the size and persistence of
 the efficiency gap.
 CONCLUSION
 Research Implications
 Here we first discuss research implications
 within the context of the model as presented and
 then research impacts across a broader context.
 In the final section we discuss managerial
 implications of the model. In the model the en-
 vironment, the organization, and the type of
 strategy used combine to help us predict the
 adoption and diffusion of strategies. One re-
 search opportunity based on the model, then, is
 to compare the adoption rates and diffusion pat-
 terns of different types of strategies. We use the
 merger and privatization examples to compare
 adoption rates and diffusion rates for these two
 types of strategies.
 Environmental uncertainty influences adop-
 tion rates and diffusion rates (Proposition 1). In
 the case of the merger wave of the 1980s, sources
 of funding increased. In turn, the increased
 availability of debt fueled many mergers
 (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987), which increased
 uncertainty about competition, since the merg-
 ing firms might have had some advantage over
 nonmerging firms. The initial mergers triggered
 other mergers, in bandwagon-like manner. For
 government services, changes in ideology and
 changes in political regimes posed uncertain-
 ties during the 1980s (Orminski, 1994; Pollit,
 1991). These changes prompted diffusion of pri-
 vatization strategies.
 A priori, it is difficult to compare levels of
 environmental uncertainty in environments that
 differ as drastically as competitive and political
 environments. The level of environmental uncer-
 tainty in the two environments might be com-
 pared on the basis of their predictability-a
 variable often used as a measure of environ-
 mental uncertainty (Wholey & Brittain, 1989).
 Consolidations and the creation of new types of
 debt instruments are less predictable than elec-
 tion outcomes (because of the limited number of
 candidates compared to the number of potential
 consolidations). Therefore, the environment sur-
 rounding mergers and acquisitions is more un-
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 certain, and they should spread through popu-
 lations more quickly than privatization. Also,
 the efficiency gap should be larger for mergers,
 and should persist longer, than that observed for
 privatization decisions.
 Properties of the macroculture also influence
 adoption rates and diffusion rates (Proposition
 2). In the case of business firms, macrocultures
 are frequently homogeneous and frequently
 linked. Concerning the latter, some authors note
 that investment banks face perverse agency in-
 centives that lead them to overemphasize
 merger and acquisition options (Kesner, Sha-
 piro, & Sharma, 1994). In addition, the popular
 press trumpets the growth of mergers.
 Comparatively speaking, privatization has a
 less defined medium for the diffusion of change.
 There are fewer visible, motivated, and power-
 ful proponents spreading the seeds of this
 change through the population of public organi-
 zations. Moreover, attempts to privatize may be
 stifled by public unions (Pouder, 1996). These
 differences in the medium of change cause
 merger waves to spread more quickly than pri-
 vatization waves.
 The theme continues through the influence of
 organizational memory (Proposition 6) and the
 characteristics of the change (Proposition 7). In-
 vestment bankers promoting mergers and ac-
 quisitions are part of the external archives (i.e.,
 memory) of the company considering the wave.
 In contrast, politicians proposing privatization
 are well removed from the active core of organi-
 zation memory for those units that eventually
 undergo privatization. Mergers are visible and
 portable strategies, adopted by elite organiza-
 tions. In comparison, privatization is less visible
 and transportable.
 We suggest, because of the characteristics of
 different types of distributions, a second type of
 research based on the model. One important
 implication of the model is that some strategies
 persist in their rate of diffusion through organi-
 zational populations, even when adoption of the
 strategy fails to obtain a favorable performance
 for a firm. Our assumption to this point has been
 that adopting managers are unaware of the po-
 tential performance problems induced by adopt-
 ing the change or, if not unaware, are convinced
 of their invulnerability to the hazards of the
 change. In addition, we have assumed that the
 efficiency gap eventually will disappear as
 knowledge of the strategy's ineffectual perfor-
 mance spreads. In some instances, though, de-
 cision makers persist in adopting actions, fully
 aware of those actions' overall negative impact
 on performance. These individuals are trapped
 by the structure of the situation-trapped be-
 cause incentives within the firm cause them to
 adopt inefficient actions. Similarly, competitive
 dynamics might trigger a decision situation in
 which all options available to the decision
 maker are inefficient.
 Consider the case of the airline industry
 (Labich, 1994). Each competitor is faced with
 high fixed costs; cutting prices is an attractive
 method for increasing revenues. Eventually, all
 competitors cut their prices to a point where a
 majority of competitors fails to recover fixed
 costs. All decision makers in the industry may
 know that this will happen, yet they persist in
 their behavior. Economists refer to this as an
 unstable pricing situation. It is a phenomenon
 that can lead to the presence of what Meyer and
 Zucker (1989) term "permanent failure."
 The possibility exists, then, for at least two
 different diffusion patterns: stable and unstable.
 The stable pattern occurs when the number of
 inefficient adoptions of a strategy eventually
 sinks to zero. In contrast, the unstable pattern
 occurs when the incidence of inefficient adop-
 tions persists. Both diffusion patterns are impor-
 tant and worthy of investigation.
 As Abrahamson (1991) notes, considerations of
 the level of analysis and timing help resolve
 research paradoxes. The paradox presented
 herein is the incidence of the widespread adop-
 tion of strategies that are apparently inefficient.
 The solution to the paradox emerges in gaining
 an understanding of strategy diffusion at a pop-
 ulation level, rather than at the organizational
 level, and in understanding the timing effects of
 diffusions. Diffusion patterns vary.
 The variance in diffusion patterns holds im-
 portant implications for strategy researchers,
 who frequently use organizational level mea-
 sures of performance for assessing widely used
 strategies. These measures of performance in-
 clude stock market valuations or accounting
 data. Stockmarket data may be subject to the
 same bandwagon effects that occur in the adop-
 tion of organizations, since the market makers
 are an interwoven part of the network defining
 the fads and fashions. Accounting measures are
 less subject to bandwagon pressures but, at
 best, are only gross measures of the value of any
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 specific action, because accounting data are ag-
 gregated across all activities for fixed units of
 times. In contrast, the strategies are discrete
 activities that represent one of hundreds of ac-
 tions undertaken in a given space of time. In
 fact, the loose links between an action taken in
 a given year and that year's accounting returns
 contribute to the sense of organizational uncer-
 tainty surrounding a strategic action. Account-
 ing data, then, although not directly subject to
 bandwagon pressures, create the conditions in
 which bandwagons occur.
 These "performance" data, presumed to be in-
 dependent of the strategies evaluated, often are
 used to build prescriptive theory. To the extent
 that the performance data are subject to the
 same bandwagon pressures as the strategy un-
 der investigation, the prescriptions that derive
 from this analysis serve to reinforce the band-
 wagon effect. Even if the performance data are
 truly independent of the bandwagon phenom-
 ena, the sample results reflect the characteris-
 tics of the diffusion pattern rather than the ob-
 jective value of the strategy per se. Put
 differently, the finding that mergers or downsiz-
 ings perform poorly may mean that the popula-
 tion sampled is one that has a persistently large
 efficiency gap. One cannot gain meaningful in-
 sight about the value of mergers or downsizing
 (or other strategic options) for a specific firm
 without direct investigation of the conditions
 surrounding the diffusion of the strategy. Useful
 prescriptions for specific firms require under-
 standing not of the performance mean but the
 performance variance. If efficiency gaps are
 common or persistent in response to the diffu-
 sion of strategies, researchers must give them
 much more attention when designing research
 samples. At a minimum, scholars should con-
 sider differences in the timing of adoptions as a
 test for the presence of changes in the distribu-
 tion.
 Most authors of strategic studies presume
 the presence of efficient selection processes
 and outcomes, rather than study the processes
 or outcomes directly. Abrahamson defines
 efficiency on the basis of comparing options
 A and B. A is more efficient if, "with equal level
 of tacit knowledge and skill on how to use A
 and B, technology A transforms equal inputs
 into greater outputs than does technology B"
 (1991: 588). To assess efficiency in strategy adop-
 tions, then, researchers should directly compare
 firms choosing different options. The comparison
 is difficult, because firms rarely have the same
 level of tacit knowledge and skill. As a substitute
 of comparing firms that adopt options A and B,
 researchers might find it beneficial to compare
 firms that adopt option A with a matched sample
 of firms that do not adopt option A.
 An alternate way of defining efficiency is to
 compare cost and benefit. Some researchers, in
 strategic studies of mergers and downsizing,
 rely on stockmarket returns at the time of the
 merger or downsizing (Lubatkin, 1983; Worrell,
 Davidson, & Sharma, 1991). If these stockmarket
 returns do not reflect full costs, they are poor
 measures of efficiency. In the case of both types
 of strategies, costs climb as the adoption is im-
 plemented with the organization. A more direct
 test of the efficiency of these strategies, then,
 might include the purchase costs and an esti-
 mate of the transaction costs. Benefits might be
 estimated on the basis of changes in sales or
 profits directly attributed to the action. If bene-
 fits decline with diffusion, the assessment of the
 benefits should include an allowance for the
 decline in value.
 It is important to note that dominant ineffi-
 cient patterns may have value for a population
 of firms. Levinthal and March write that "it is
 relatively unusual for a strategy that maximizes
 the prospects for survival of the components of a
 system to be the same as a strategy that maxi-
 mizes the survival of the system as a whole"
 (1993: 103). The presence of an efficiency gap is
 not sufficient evidence to judge a strategy as
 "bad." An innovation that is inefficient for a
 majority of organizations may be good for the
 population of organizations or for the clients
 they serve (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993). For
 example, downsizing may not lead to positive
 outcomes in the majority of organizations adopt-
 ing downsizing strategies, but it might increase
 the net efficiency of the entire population. Sim-
 ilarly, individual mergers might fail frequently,
 but, overall, the market for control induced by
 mergers might serve as an efficient method for
 eliminating managerial excesses (Walsh &
 Seward, 1990). Strategy scholars' general focus
 on outcomes at the individual firm level may be
 overly narrow if that focus is used to make nor-
 mative conclusions about a strategy. At a mini-
 mum, attempts at evaluation should consider
 both firm-level and system-wide effects.
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 One way to test population effects for down-
 sizing, for example, is to observe patterns in job
 movements at the national level. Upon observ-
 ing only downsizing firms, an observer can con-
 clude that middle managers absorb a dispropor-
 tionate amount of downsizing. Yet Gordon (1996)
 notes that most of these managers are reab-
 sorbed in the economy and that the middle man-
 agement ranks have actually grown during the
 downsizing of the 1990s. Aggregate data (job
 reductions and job creations) and the study of
 movements of labor (input-output differences
 across industries) provide researchers with the
 means to study population effects.
 We suggest that a final illustration of fruitful
 research would be an attempt to study temporal
 shifts in the types of strategies adopted. For
 example, in longitudinal studies researchers
 might investigate why bandwagon effects ap-
 pear for different types of mergers in close suc-
 cession: the rise and fall of conglomerate merg-
 ers in the 1960s and related mergers in the 1980s.
 With our propositions as guideposts, research-
 ers could compare, for each period, the impor-
 tance of environmental and organizational vari-
 ables as predictors of diffusion patterns. This or
 similar research might help predict the diffusion
 pattern that might be expected in the current
 wave of business mergers.
 Managerial Implications
 Although there are many management impli-
 cations in the model presented here, one ap-
 pears dominant. Can managers improve their
 chances of attaining the intended performance
 in adopting strategies? The answer to this ques-
 tion depends on remedies for cognitive limits
 and the capability to copy well.
 The major cause of the efficiency gap is fail-
 ure to recognize and respond to the influence of
 cognitive biases in the face of uncertainty. Ac-
 tually, managers may be only minimally aware
 that they are copying strategies in these situa-
 tions. Increased understanding of the causes
 and effects of decision biases might increase
 management sensitivity to the issues posed by
 this model. That sensitivity, combined with good
 governance procedures, could minimize the in-
 cidence of long-lasting gaps. There has been a
 wealth of research directed at the issue of cog-
 nitive biases, and protections against these bi-
 ases, at the individual and group level (Einhorn
 & Hogarth, 1978; Miller & Ross, 1975; Walsh, 1988;
 Zajac & Bazerman, 1991). However, little of this
 research deals directly with issues in strategic
 management.
 If adoptions are mimetic, can managers learn
 to copy well? Evidence to answer this question
 has not been accumulated directly. Zajac and
 Bazerman (1991) and Zahra and Chaples (1993)
 describe "blind spots" in competitive analysis.
 Zajac and Bazerman suggest that the blind spots
 generally are strong tendencies (1991: 52)-a
 conclusion we interpret as difficult to reverse.
 Three different paths to reversal seem possible
 though. One path is based on acceptance of
 blind spots as a natural barrier in decision mak-
 ing and on eliminating reliance on poorly seen,
 distant data. A second path is based on theories
 of information processing (Daft & Lengel, 1986).
 Information processes should match the charac-
 teristics of the problem studied. For example,
 adopters should seek information about compet-
 itors (Amit, Domowitz, & Fershtman, 1988).
 A third path to better copying is based on a
 learning perspective. Learning requires experi-
 ence and time (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996;
 Sitkin, 1992). To copy well, a firm or manager
 must copy long. Dierickx and Cool (1989) de-
 scribe time compression effects in learning, or
 diminishing returns to attempts to speed up the
 process. Managers who copy well adopt long-
 term perspectives and tolerate early inefficien-
 cies in the process.
 In summary, we have suggested that certain
 strategy choices spread through organizational
 fields and become legitimized, without full re-
 gard to the performance outcomes accruing to
 these innovations. Both scholars and managers
 would benefit from knowledge of how to suc-
 cessfully differentiate performance-enhancing
 from performance-inhibiting strategies early in
 their diffusion wave.
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